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Microsoft 365 emergency admin access: set up and test break-glass accounts

How to set up two emergency (break-glass) Global Administrator accounts with FIDO2 security keys, keep Conditional Access from locking them out, get alerted when they are used and test them safely without causing an incident.

Start here

Create two cloud-only Global Administrator accounts on your onmicrosoft.com domain and give each its own FIDO2 security key as the sign-in method. If you have Entra ID P1, exclude both from any Conditional Access policy that blocks or restricts sign-in. Alert on every sign-in, store the keys somewhere secure that more than one authorised person can reach, then prove it all works by signing in with each key from a clean browser, checking the sign-in log and alert, and repeating at least every 90 days.

What you are setting up and what you need

An emergency access account (usually called a break-glass account) is a Global Administrator login that exists for one job: getting you back into Microsoft 365 when your normal administrators cannot sign in. The classic triggers are a lost or broken phone holding everyone's authenticator, a federation or identity-provider outage, the last Global Administrator leaving, or a Conditional Access policy that locks out everyone including the people who could fix it. Microsoft recommends at least two such accounts, cloud-only, on your tenant's onmicrosoft.com domain, tied to no individual person or personal device.

One thing has changed that older guides get wrong. Microsoft now enforces multifactor authentication (MFA) when signing in to the Microsoft 365 admin center, the Entra admin center and the Azure portal, and its documentation says emergency access accounts are included. A password-only break-glass account is no longer an option. Microsoft recommends a passkey (FIDO2) or certificate-based authentication, both of which satisfy the requirement. This guide uses a FIDO2 security key because it needs no certificate infrastructure.

Which tools you can use depends on your licensing. Conditional Access needs Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher. Without it, security defaults is the free baseline: it is simply on or off, with no customisation. If security defaults is on, there is nothing to exclude, so skip the Conditional Access section. Microsoft's security defaults page describes Authenticator-app registration and does not list passkeys, so check at the test stage that the key sign-in completes cleanly in your tenant.

  • Global Administrator access for the setup. You will create users, assign roles, edit the authentication methods policy and (with P1) edit Conditional Access.
  • Two FIDO2 security keys that support a PIN or fingerprint, one per account. Passkeys (FIDO2) are available in every Microsoft Entra edition, including Free, with no extra licence.
  • A safe, a locked cabinet or similar secure place, ideally two separate locations, that more than one authorised person can reach.
  • A named list of the two or more people allowed to use the accounts.
  • A clean browser profile or private window on a designated, trusted workstation for registration and testing.

Create the two accounts and a group for them

Do this as a Global Administrator. Nothing here affects existing users. The group created at the end is what you will target and exclude later, so one change covers both accounts now and any account you add in future.

Use plain, neutral names such as Emergency Access 01 and Emergency Access 02. The accounts must not be synced from on-premises Active Directory and must not use a custom domain that depends on federation. Keeping the cloud and on-premises emergency routes independent means one outage cannot take out both.

  1. Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center at entra.microsoft.com as a Global Administrator.
  2. Go to Entra ID > Users and select New user > Create new user.
  3. Set the user principal name on your tenant's onmicrosoft.com domain, for example emergency01 at YOURTENANT.onmicrosoft.com, and give it the display name Emergency Access 01. Set a long, random password generated by a password manager and select Create. You are not planning to use it day to day, but record it with the key's PIN in your secure record (separately from the key itself).
  4. Repeat for the second account, Emergency Access 02.
  5. Go to Entra ID > Roles & admins, open Global Administrator, select Add assignments and add both accounts. If you use Privileged Identity Management, make the assignment active and permanent, not eligible. An eligible assignment needs an activation step that could itself fail in an emergency.
  6. Go to Entra ID > Groups > New group. Choose Security as the group type, name it EmergencyAccess, add both accounts as members and select Create.
  7. Open each account's page and confirm the Global Administrator role shows under Assigned roles.

Give each account its own security key

A new account has no MFA method, so it needs a way to register its first key. A Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is a time-limited code an administrator creates for exactly that bootstrapping job. Treat the TAP as a live credential for a Global Administrator account while it exists: use a one-time pass with a short lifetime and delete it afterwards.

Microsoft documents that a user must have completed MFA within the past five minutes before registering a passkey, and that a one-time TAP used to register a security key requires registration to finish within 10 minutes of sign-in. Have both keys, the registration workstation and a second person to hand before you create the pass.

Opting in to passkey profiles, if the portal asks, cannot be undone. Your existing passkey settings move into a Default passkey profile, so this is safe on a tenant with no passkey rollout, but check with whoever owns authentication settings first if other people manage them.

  1. In the Entra admin center, go to Entra ID > Authentication methods > Policies and select Passkey (FIDO2). You need at least the Authentication Policy Administrator role. If a banner offers passkey profiles, opt in using the warning above. On the Configure tab, set Allow self-service set up to Yes, otherwise users cannot register a passkey at Security info.
  2. Under Enable and Target, select Add target > Select targets, choose the EmergencyAccess group and assign the Default passkey profile (or a profile of your own). If you turn on Enforce attestation, your security key model must be one Microsoft Entra ID accepts for attestation, otherwise registration will be refused. Select Save.
  3. Go to Authentication methods > Policies again and select Temporary Access Pass. Select Enable, include the EmergencyAccess group and save. In Configure, you can set one-time use to Yes so every pass in the tenant is single use. Allow a few minutes for the policy to replicate.
  4. Go to Entra ID > Users, open Emergency Access 01, select Authentication methods > Add authentication method, choose Temporary Access Pass, set a short duration and select Add. Copy the pass immediately, because it cannot be shown again after you select OK. You need Privileged Authentication Administrator rights to create a pass for an administrator account.
  5. In a private browser window, open mysignins.microsoft.com/security-info and sign in as Emergency Access 01 using the pass. Select Add sign-in method > Choose a method > Passkey > Next, choose Security key, then plug the key in and follow the prompts to set a PIN and touch it. Give the method a recognisable name and select Done.
  6. Check that Security info now lists the passkey as a sign-in method, then close the window. Repeat steps 4 to 6 for Emergency Access 02 with the second key.
  7. When both accounts are registered, go back to the Temporary Access Pass policy and remove the EmergencyAccess group from its targets (or disable the policy if nobody else uses it). Otherwise anyone able to create a pass for these accounts has an easy route into two Global Administrator logins. Re-enable it only when you need to replace a key.

Stop Conditional Access from locking them out

Skip this section if you are on security defaults. If you have Entra ID P1, a policy that requires a compliant device, a trusted location or a particular platform could make these accounts unusable in the very emergency they exist for. Microsoft's guidance is to exclude emergency access accounts from Conditional Access policies that block or restrict sign-in, using a dedicated group.

You will find advice online to exclude them from every policy, and advice to use a single dedicated policy instead. Microsoft's wording is narrower than the first and does not prescribe the second: policies in report-only mode do not block anything and need no exclusion. In practice, excluding the group from every enforced policy that blocks or restricts sign-in is simple and easy to audit.

The exclusion does not switch off MFA. Mandatory MFA enforcement applies to break-glass accounts regardless of Conditional Access exclusions, which is why the security key matters. The exclusion only means your own policies cannot get in the way.

  1. Sign in as at least a Conditional Access Administrator and go to Entra ID > Conditional Access > Policies.
  2. Open each policy that is turned On and go to Assignments > Users or workload identities. Under Exclude, select Users and groups, choose the EmergencyAccess group and save. Policies in Report-only mode can be left alone, though many admins add the exclusion anyway so it is already in place when the policy goes live.
  3. Do the same for any new policy you create from now on. A new policy that targets All users with no exclusion is the classic way to lock out the break-glass accounts. When you build one, get into the habit of adding the exclusion before you enable it.
  4. Optionally, use the What If tool on the Conditional Access page: select an emergency account as the user, choose All resources and check that no policy is listed as applying.

Get alerted when either account signs in

Nobody should be using these accounts casually, so every sign-in should reach a human straight away. That serves two purposes: it flags a genuine emergency, and it catches misuse. Microsoft's worked example uses Azure Monitor and a Log Analytics workspace. That needs an Azure subscription, and log ingestion and retention may incur charges. If you do not run Azure Monitor, Microsoft Sentinel or a comparable monitoring tool, at minimum put a recurring reminder in the diary to review the sign-in logs for both accounts.

You need the Object ID of each account (on its page in Entra ID > Users) and your Microsoft Entra sign-in logs must already be sent to the Log Analytics workspace through diagnostic settings. Do the alert setup as someone with at least the Monitoring Contributor role.

  1. In the Azure portal, open Monitor > Alerts, then select Create > Alert rule.
  2. On the Scope tab, select your Log Analytics workspace. On the Condition tab, set Signal name to Custom log search and Query type to Aggregated logs, then paste a query like the one below, replacing the two placeholders with your Object IDs.
    text
    SigninLogs
    | where UserId == "OBJECT_ID_OF_ACCOUNT_1" or UserId == "OBJECT_ID_OF_ACCOUNT_2"
    | project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, UserId, IPAddress, ResultType, ResultDescription
  3. Under Alert logic, set Threshold type to Static, Operator to Greater than and Threshold value to 0, and choose how often the query runs. On the Actions tab, select an action group that emails or texts at least two administrators who are not the emergency accounts themselves.
  4. On the Details tab, set Severity to 0 - Critical, name the rule, and make sure Enable upon creation is selected under Advanced options. Select Review + create, then Create.

Test sign-in without causing an incident

A break-glass account nobody has tested is just a lockout with extra paperwork. The test is deliberately boring: sign in, look around, change nothing, sign out. Do it for each account and each key.

Tell whoever receives the alert before you start, or the first test will wake somebody up. Use a different person from the one who registered the keys if you can, because the point is to prove the process works for someone who was not there at setup. Do not disable or change your normal administrators' MFA to make the test feel more realistic.

  1. Tell the alert recipients, and anyone watching sign-in monitoring, that a planned drill is about to happen.
  2. Collect the key and its PIN from the secure location exactly as someone would in a real emergency. If this is awkward or needs a call to someone who is on holiday, you have found the first thing to fix.
  3. On the designated workstation, open a private browser window and go to admin.microsoft.com. Enter the account's user principal name, choose the security key or passkey option when offered, then enter the PIN and touch the key.
  4. Confirm you reach the Microsoft 365 admin center without being sent into an MFA loop or an error. Open the Entra admin center as well, go to Entra ID > Roles & admins > Global Administrator and confirm the account is listed. That proves it can read and perform administrative tasks without you changing a thing. Then sign out and close the window.
  5. In the Entra admin center, go to Entra ID > Monitoring & health > Sign-in logs, which needs at least the Reports Reader role. Filter by the emergency account and open the entry. Entries can take a few minutes to appear. You want Status showing Success and, on the Conditional Access tab, no enforced policy blocking the sign-in.
  6. Check that the alert arrived with the sign-in details you expect. Alerts based on log queries run on a schedule, so allow for the evaluation frequency you chose.
  7. Repeat for the second account, then write down the date, who ran the test, what was checked and the result. Put the keys back where they belong.

Keep them usable

Microsoft's recommendation is to validate the accounts at least every 90 days, and also when IT staff change or when your Microsoft Entra subscriptions change. Each drill is the same test as above, plus a check that the list of authorised people is still right and that the written procedure is current.

Make sure nothing quietly breaks them in between. The credential must not expire or fall under automated clean-up for inactivity, so exclude these accounts from any stale-account scripts or review routines you run. Do not register either account's MFA or password reset to an individual's phone or personal details. Store keys, PINs and the account password separately, ideally in secure places that are physically apart, and change safe combinations when someone with access leaves.

If an emergency account is ever used for real, or the alert fires and nobody expected it, preserve the logs and review what was done. Work out whether it was a drill, a genuine emergency or misuse. After a real use, change the password and consider replacing the key before returning it to storage.

If it does not work

Most failures come down to a policy that does not include the account or a time limit that ran out during registration. If you are already locked out of every administrator account, this guide cannot help directly. Recovery then depends on Microsoft support verifying that you own the tenant, which is slower and less predictable than having a tested account. Contact Microsoft support and keep your tenant's onmicrosoft.com name and billing details to hand.

  • The security key is not offered at Security info: check that the EmergencyAccess group is targeted in the Passkey (FIDO2) policy, that Allow self-service set up is Yes and that the account is not in an excluded group in that policy.
  • Registration is refused: confirm you completed MFA or a TAP sign-in within the last few minutes, that a one-time pass was used within 10 minutes, and that your key model satisfies any attestation or key restriction settings in the passkey profile.
  • You are pushed into a different registration screen after using the TAP: Microsoft notes that users in scope for the self-service password reset registration policy or the Entra ID Protection MFA registration policy are redirected to a combined registration experience, which does not currently support registering FIDO2 keys. Remove the accounts from those policy scopes for registration, or involve an administrator who manages them.
  • Sign-in succeeds but the sign-in log shows a Conditional Access failure: the group exclusion is missing from that policy or has not yet replicated. Fix the policy, wait a few minutes and test again.
  • The admin centers keep asking for MFA or loop: the account has no phishing-resistant method registered, or you are signing in with the password alone. Choose the key option at the sign-in prompt.
  • Security defaults asks for the Authenticator app instead of accepting the key: the free baseline is built around Authenticator-based MFA. If the key will not work cleanly in your tenant, that is a real limit of the setup, and a good moment to talk to someone about licensing rather than putting an emergency account on a personal phone.
Technical terms explained
attestation
A check made when a passkey is registered that lets Microsoft Entra ID verify the make and model of the security key. If enforced, only keys it recognises can be registered.
break-glass account
An emergency administrator account kept for the rare occasions when normal administrators cannot sign in. It is not used day to day, is not tied to one person and every use should raise an alert.
Conditional Access
A Microsoft Entra feature that decides whether to allow, block or challenge a sign-in based on conditions such as user, device, location and risk. It needs Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher.
Log Analytics workspace
An Azure data store that can receive Microsoft Entra sign-in logs and be queried to trigger alerts.
passkey (FIDO2)
A phishing-resistant sign-in credential based on public-key cryptography. A FIDO2 security key is a physical device that holds the credential and releases it only when you enter a PIN or use a fingerprint and touch it.
Privileged Identity Management
A Microsoft Entra feature (Entra ID P2 or Governance licensing) that makes admin roles eligible and activated on demand instead of permanently assigned.
security defaults
A free, on-or-off set of baseline identity protections in Microsoft Entra ID that includes requiring MFA for administrators and blocking legacy authentication. It cannot be customised.
Temporary Access Pass
A time-limited code an administrator creates so a user can sign in and register their first passwordless method, such as a security key. It can be set to single use.

Sources and further reading

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