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EVOLVING SECURITY ADVISORY / PERFORCE PUPPET ENTERPRISE AND PUPPET CORE REPORT DESERIALIZATION REMOTE CODE EXECUTION (CVE-2026-115731)

Puppet Enterprise Server Flaw CVE-2026-115731: Check, Patch, Respond

A critical Puppet Server flaw is now on CISA's exploited list. Here is who is affected, how to check your version and autosign setting, which releases fix it and what to look for afterwards.

What matters now

Current position: Critical - patch available; listed in CISA KEV

Affected versions: Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 to before 2023.8.13, 2025.0.0 to before 2025.12.1, 2026.0.0 to before 2026.0.1; Puppet Core 8.x before 8.22.2 and 9.x before 9.1.3; OpenVox Server before 8.18.0 (8.x) and 9.2.0 (9.x).

Observed exploitation: CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 17 November 2026 citing evidence of active exploitation. No threat actor, campaign or victim has been publicly identified. A proof of concept is published in the OpenVox advisory. A vendor statement of no known attacks is reported by one outlet and conflicts with CISA.

Recommended next action: Upgrade Puppet Server to a fixed release, disable certificate autosigning until then, restrict access to port 8140, and review CA-signed certificates for anything unexpected.

Identifiers: CVE-2026-115731

Immediate guidance

If you run Puppet Enterprise or Puppet Core, check whether your Puppet Server is below the fixed releases (Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1; Puppet Core 8.22.2 or 9.1.3) and upgrade it. CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 17 November 2026. While you arrange the upgrade, check whether certificate autosigning is enabled and turn it off if it is. Patching does not remove an attacker who is already in, so review the certificates your CA has signed.

At a glance - position as of 18 November 2026

CVE-2026-115731 is a flaw in how Puppet Server processes reports sent by agents. A client holding any certificate signed by the Puppet certificate authority can send a crafted report and make the server run code as its service user. Puppet Server sits at the centre of a configuration estate, so this is a poor place to lose control. Perforce's stated impact includes exposure of the server's certificate-signing key and changes to the software and configuration delivered to managed systems on their next Puppet run.

Perforce released fixed versions on 3 November 2026. CISA added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogue on 17 November 2026, citing evidence of active exploitation, with a federal remediation deadline of 1 December 2026. UK organisations are not bound by that date, but it is a sensible yardstick for a flaw of this kind.

The immediate action is to patch Puppet Server and, until that is done, to disable certificate autosigning unless every request is strongly verified. A related certificate-name flaw, CVE-2026-115732, was reported as fixed in the same releases, so one upgrade covers both.

Who should check

The vulnerable component is Puppet Server, the machine that signs certificates and processes agent reports. If you run compilers or replicas, they are part of the job too. Machines that only run the agent do not process reports, so servers come first and agents can follow on your normal schedule.

The CVE record lists these Puppet Enterprise ranges as affected, with the first version in each line that contains the fix:

  • Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 up to but not including 2023.8.13 - fixed in 2023.8.13
  • Puppet Enterprise 2025.0.0 up to but not including 2025.12.1 - fixed in 2025.12.1
  • Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0 up to but not including 2026.0.1 - fixed in 2026.0.1
  • Puppet Core 8.x before 8.22.2 and 9.x before 9.1.3 - fixed in 8.22.2 and 9.1.3
  • OpenVox Server before 8.18.0 (8.x) or 9.2.0 (9.x) - the OpenVox project published its own advisory and fixes
  • Unsupported open-source Puppet is also reported as affected, and the vendor is not shipping open-source updates, so those servers need to move to a supported product

How serious is it, and what is the evidence?

The vendor rates it 9.4 out of 10 on the CVSS 4.0 scale and NVD scores it 9.9 on CVSS 3.1. Both are critical. The exploit needs a valid agent certificate, so the real question is how easy one is to obtain. If your CA autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Puppet Server port may be able to request their own certificate and then use it. If you sign manually, an attacker needs a certificate you already issued.

On exploitation, the evidence is mixed and worth stating carefully. CISA lists the flaw as exploited, which is credible evidence that attacks have happened. SecurityWeek reports that exploitation was flagged on 4 November through a community forum comment, though the original reporter is not named. One report quotes the vendor as not being aware of attacks as of its latest statement. CISA has not named an actor, a campaign or any victim, and neither has anyone else we found, so treat any claim naming one as unverified.

A working proof of concept appears in the OpenVox project's public advisory, so the technique is not secret. That is a good reason not to wait for the next maintenance window.

Find out whether you are exposed

These two checks only read information. Run them on the Puppet Server (the primary server in a Puppet Enterprise deployment) as an administrator or root. They change nothing.

  1. Check the running version. On Puppet Enterprise the first command prints the installed release; on Puppet Core the second prints the version. Compare the result with the fixed releases above.
    bash
    cat /opt/puppetlabs/server/pe_version
    puppet --version
  2. Check how certificates are signed. The output tells you how exposed you are: the word true means the CA signs every request it receives, so anyone who can reach the server can get a certificate. A path to an autosign.conf file means you should read that file, because wildcard entries let any host that picks a matching unused name be signed. A path to a script means the protection depends entirely on what that script verifies. The value false means requests wait for a person to approve them.
    bash
    puppet config print autosign --section server

Reduce exposure while you arrange the upgrade

Turning off autosigning does not fix the flaw. Anyone who already holds a valid certificate can still send a malicious report. What it does is stop a stranger acquiring a certificate without you noticing, which is the step that turns an authenticated bug into an open door.

The service impact is real. New machines will sit waiting for manual approval, so build pipelines or provisioning scripts that rely on automatic signing will stall until someone signs the request or the upgrade is complete. You need administrative access to the Puppet Server and to whatever configuration management controls its settings.

  1. Set autosign to false in the server section of puppet.conf, or switch to a policy script that genuinely verifies each request. If puppet.conf is managed by code or by the Puppet Enterprise console, make the change there so it is not reverted.
    text
    [server]
    autosign = false
  2. Run the autosign check again from the previous section. It should now report false, or the path to a script you have reviewed.
  3. Restrict network access to the Puppet Server port (8140 by default) to the networks that contain your agents, using your firewall or security group rules. Do not leave it reachable from the wider internet.

Install the fixed release

Upgrade the primary server first, then compilers and replicas. For Puppet Enterprise, use the supported upgrade route for your release line to reach 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1. For Puppet Core, move to 8.22.2 or 9.1.3. OpenVox users should take Server 8.18.0 or 9.2.0 with the matching agent package, and should check any custom authorization rules afterwards.

Expect Puppet Server to be unavailable to agents while it restarts, so choose a window when a short gap in Puppet runs is acceptable. Take whatever backup or snapshot your change process requires before an upgrade of this importance, because the CA holds your signing key and its data directory matters.

  1. Upgrade the primary server to a fixed release.
  2. If you upgraded only a package on a server, restart the Puppet Server service yourself, otherwise the old code stays loaded. A full Puppet Enterprise upgrade handles services for you.
    bash
    systemctl restart puppetserver
  3. Upgrade compilers and replicas, then agents on your normal schedule.
  4. Confirm the result by running the version commands from the earlier section. The version should be at or above the fixed release, and a test agent run should complete and appear in your reports.

Check whether anyone got in first

A patch closes the door. It does not evict someone already inside, and a stolen CA key keeps working after the fix is installed. The signing key is the thing to worry about: if an attacker has it, they can issue trusted certificates at will.

List every certificate the CA knows about. This is a read-only command, run on the server as an administrator.

  • Certificates you do not recognise, especially any that match an autosign pattern and appeared since early November 2026
  • Unexpected child processes of the Puppet Server Java process, or shell commands and outbound connections run by the puppet service user
  • Changes to manifests, environments or Puppet-managed configuration that nobody on your team made
bash
puppetserver ca list --all

If you find something suspicious

Treat the CA key as compromised. That generally means rebuilding the server, issuing a new CA, re-enrolling every agent and rotating any secrets that pass through Puppet catalogues. Upgrading while keeping the old CA would let an attacker sign their way back in. This is incident-response work with a lot of knock-on impact. Isolate the server from the network, preserve logs and bring in specialist help rather than improvising a rebuild. Public sources do not tie this CVE to any named victim, so there is no published list to compare yourself against.

If you cannot answer the questions above with confidence, say so early. Not knowing which machines can reach your Puppet Server is a common and fixable starting point.

Update history

We’ll keep this page updated as new information becomes available. Check back for the latest developments.

  1. 18 November 2026 - Initial article published as a draft: affected and fixed versions, autosign checks, upgrade guidance and compromise review based on the CVE record, the OpenVox and Vox Pupuli advisories, and independent reporting. Update source

  2. 17 November 2026 - CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on evidence of active exploitation, with a due date of 1 December 2026 for US federal agencies. Update source

  3. 3 November 2026 - Perforce released Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 and 2026.0.1 and Puppet Core 8.22.2 and 9.1.3 to fix the flaw; the OpenVox project published matching fixes the same day. Update source

Technical terms explained
autosign
A Puppet certificate authority setting that signs agent certificate requests automatically. If it is not tightly controlled, any machine that can reach the server may obtain a trusted certificate.
certificate authority
The Puppet service that signs and issues the certificates agents use to prove their identity. Its signing key is what makes issued certificates trusted.
compilers
Additional Puppet servers in larger Puppet Enterprise installations that build configuration catalogues for agents. They run the same server software and need patching too.
deserialization
Turning received data back into objects inside a program. If the data is not checked, a crafted payload can make the program run code the attacker chose.
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
A CISA catalogue of vulnerabilities for which there is credible evidence of exploitation. A listing does not identify victims or say that your systems have been attacked.
remote code execution
A flaw that lets an attacker run their own commands on another computer over a network.

Sources and further reading

KEEP THE CONVERSATION GOING

Need a second pair of hands?

If you are unsure where your Puppet Server is exposed, or you need help checking certificates and planning the upgrade, we are happy to talk it through.

Contact Rismor