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EVOLVING SECURITY ADVISORY / SIEMENS SIMATIC SECURITY ADVISORY SSA-970803 / CISA ICSA-26-321-08

Siemens SIMATIC WinCC and PCS 7 NTLM Flaw (CVE-2026-58114)

Siemens says all versions of several SIMATIC SCADA and PCS 7 products allow NTLM relay (CVE-2026-58114). No fix is available or planned, so SQL Server encryption and network isolation are the actions that matter now.

What matters now

Current position: Mitigation available; no fix available or planned. CVSS v3.1 7.5 (High), v4.0 7.7.

Affected versions: All versions of SIMATIC BATCH V9.1; Information Server 2020 and 2022; PCS 7 V9.1; Process Historian 2020 and 2022; WinCC V7.5, V8.0, V8.1; WinCC Runtime Professional V17, V18, V19, V20, V21.

Observed exploitation: Not reported in the Siemens or CISA advisories; no credible exploitation report located in the sources checked as of 17 November 2026.

Recommended next action: Isolate control networks, restrict who can reach the SQL Server, and configure SQL Server encrypted communication following Siemens support article 109818202, using a trial system and a maintenance window.

Identifiers: CVE-2026-58114

Immediate guidance

As of 17 November 2026, Siemens lists every version of SIMATIC WinCC V7.5, V8.0 and V8.1, WinCC Runtime Professional V17 to V21, PCS 7 V9.1, BATCH V9.1, Process Historian 2020 and 2022 and Information Server 2020 and 2022 as affected by CVE-2026-58114. There is no fix: for most products Siemens says none is planned, and for WinCC it says none is currently available. The vendor mitigation is to configure the SQL Server database to encrypt communication, following Siemens support article 109818202, while keeping control-system networks isolated so nobody untrusted can sit between your clients and the database. Neither Siemens nor CISA reports exploitation in the wild.

At a glance: where things stand on 17 November 2026

Siemens ProductCERT published advisory SSA-970803 on 10 November 2026. CISA republished it as ICSA-26-321-08 (revision 2) on 17 November 2026. It covers one vulnerability, CVE-2026-58114, a weak-authentication issue (CWE-1390) in how the affected products handle remote user authentication with NTLM, an older Windows sign-in protocol.

The practical position is uncomfortable: there is nothing to install. Your protection for now is configuration and network design, not a patch. The two things to act on are limiting who can get onto the network path between your SIMATIC clients and the SQL Server they use, and enabling encrypted SQL Server communication as Siemens describes.

  • Vendor: Siemens. Advisory: SSA-970803 (Siemens) and ICSA-26-321-08 (CISA).
  • Severity: CVSS v3.1 base score 7.5 (High); Siemens also publishes a CVSS v4.0 score of 7.7.
  • Fix: none available or planned (see the next section for each product).
  • Exploitation: not reported in the Siemens or CISA advisories as of this update.

Which SIMATIC systems are affected

Siemens states that all versions of the products below are affected. If you run one of them, assume you are in scope; there is no unaffected build to move to within these product lines.

  • SIMATIC BATCH V9.1 - no fix planned.
  • SIMATIC Information Server 2020 and 2022 - no fix planned.
  • SIMATIC PCS 7 V9.1 - no fix planned.
  • SIMATIC Process Historian 2020 and 2022 - no fix planned.
  • SIMATIC WinCC V7.5, V8.0 and V8.1 - no fix currently available.
  • SIMATIC WinCC Runtime Professional V17, V18, V19, V20 and V21 - no fix currently available.
  • Siemens' general wording says it is preparing fixes, but the per-product status is what applies to you. Treat 'no fix currently available' as 'check again', and 'no fix planned' as 'plan around it'.

What the flaw means in practice

NTLM is an older Windows authentication protocol. In a relay attack, someone positioned between a legitimate user and a server passes the user's authentication exchange along to a service of their own choosing, and so acts as that user. Siemens describes this as a machine-in-the-middle position, and says the impact depends on which services the relayed identity can reach, with a SQL Server used by WinCC given as the example.

That precondition is what keeps this at 7.5 rather than higher. The attacker has to be on the network path already, and in the v3.1 vector attack complexity is rated high and user interaction is required. On a properly isolated control network that is a real hurdle. On a flat network where office PCs, contractors' laptops and the SQL Server all share a segment, it is a much smaller one.

One wording difference is worth knowing about. CISA's summary says an attacker could run arbitrary code with the user's privileges. Siemens' own description only says the attacker could impersonate a legitimate user, with impact depending on the services reachable. Plan around the Siemens wording, and remember that what a database login can do on your systems is something only you can judge.

What to do now

Do these in order. The first two are read-only and can be done today. The SQL Server change is the one that can disrupt a running plant system, so it belongs in a planned maintenance window after a trial on a non-production or standby system.

Siemens' mitigation article (support.industry.siemens.com, entry 109818202) is the authority on how to configure this for the affected products. It needs a browser with JavaScript enabled, and you may need to follow the instructions for your specific product and version, because encryption settings generally have to agree on both the SQL Server side and the Siemens software side. The Microsoft steps below describe the SQL Server half.

  1. List every installation of the products above, with version, and note which SQL Server instance each one uses. Process Historian and Information Server are easy to forget because they sit behind the main HMI or engineering systems.
  2. Map who and what can reach each of those SQL Server instances. The aim is to be able to say that only the intended SIMATIC clients and servers share a network path with it. Keep control networks behind firewalls and separated from business networks, and use current, updated VPNs for any remote access, as CISA recommends. Anything you cannot explain on that path is the first thing to remove.
  3. Check whether your environment uses Kerberos. Siemens notes that where Kerberos is not in use, which needs a domain with the service principal name (SPN) set, you have to assess the NTLM risk yourself. If you are not sure, treat NTLM as in use.
  4. Prepare SQL Server encryption on a test or standby system first, following Siemens article 109818202. On the SQL Server, Microsoft's route is SQL Server Configuration Manager: expand SQL Server Network Configuration, open the properties of Protocols for your instance, and on the Flags tab set Force Encryption to Yes. Use a certificate from a trusted authority if you can. SQL Server will otherwise fall back to a self-generated certificate, which Microsoft notes does not protect against the server being impersonated.
  5. In the maintenance window, apply the same configuration to production. This needs local administrator rights on the SQL Server, and the SQL Server service has to restart for the change to take effect. That interrupts historian logging, archiving and any client currently connected, so coordinate it with operations and have a way to switch Force Encryption back to No if clients cannot reconnect. If the service account cannot read the certificate's private key, the restart can fail, so check that first.
  6. Confirm it worked. Run the read-only query below from SQL Server Management Studio or a similar tool, logged in with permission to view server state. If every remote connection is encrypted, it returns a single row showing TRUE. A FALSE row means at least one remote client is still connecting without encryption, so find it before you consider the job finished. Connections made locally through shared memory are excluded by the query.
    sql
    USE [master];
    GO
    
    SELECT DISTINCT (encrypt_option)
    FROM sys.dm_exec_connections
    WHERE net_transport <> 'Shared memory';
    GO

Extended Protection: ask before you add it

Microsoft's documentation describes a further SQL Server setting called Extended Protection, which ties the authentication exchange to the service and, with encryption, to the secure channel, and is designed to defeat relay attacks. It only works when clients use a supporting Windows driver, encrypt the connection, and connect using the correct SPN. Set to Required, it rejects clients that cannot meet those conditions.

Siemens' advisory names encryption, not Extended Protection, as its mitigation. Our view is that it is worth raising with Siemens support for your specific product and version before enabling it on a production system, because a plant client that suddenly cannot reach its database is a worse day than the one you were trying to avoid.

Patch position and what to watch for

There is currently no fixed version to deploy, so there is nothing to verify as patched. The advisory page for ICSA-26-321-08 and Siemens ProductCERT are where a change in fix status would appear; this article will be updated if it does. CISA also advises performing an impact analysis and risk assessment before deploying defensive measures, which is sensible on a live process system.

Encryption reduces the opportunity for relay, but it does not tell you whether anyone has already tried it. If you hold network monitoring or SQL Server login logs for these systems, unexpected Windows logins to the database from hosts that are not SIMATIC clients are worth reviewing.

Real-world exploitation

The Siemens and CISA advisories do not report exploitation in the wild, and in the sources checked for this update we found no credible report naming an affected organisation. That is not proof that nobody has tried it, and the absence of a report should not delay the network and SQL Server actions above. We will update this page if a credible authority or vendor reports exploitation.

Update history

We’ll keep this page updated as new information becomes available. Check back for the latest developments.

  1. Initial entry. Siemens published SSA-970803 on 10 November 2026 and CISA republished it as ICSA-26-321-08 (revision 2) on 17 November 2026. All versions of the listed SIMATIC products are affected, no fix is available or planned, and the vendor mitigation is encrypted SQL Server communication. Update source

Technical terms explained
CVSS
A standard score from 0 to 10 for the technical severity of a vulnerability. It does not measure how likely exploitation is.
Force Encryption
A SQL Server setting, in SQL Server Configuration Manager, that makes the server require encrypted connections from every client. The service must be restarted for it to apply.
Kerberos
The default Windows domain authentication protocol, which uses tickets tied to named services. It needs correctly registered service principal names (SPNs).
machine-in-the-middle
An attacker positioned on the network path between two systems, able to intercept and forward their traffic.
NTLM
An older Windows challenge-and-response authentication protocol. Microsoft is moving away from it in favour of Kerberos, because it is more exposed to relay attacks.

Sources and further reading

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